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Canvas Connect logoCanvas Connect

This project is archived.

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About

Canvas Connect is a Layer 2 solution based on StarkEx technology, specifically designed to provide centralized investment and trading services to financial institutions.

Value secured
$149.8816.9%
Canonically Bridged
$149.88
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$0.00
View TVS Breakdown
  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    No data
  • 30D ops count
    No data
  • Type
    Validium
  • Purposes
    Privacy, Exchange
    • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Canvas Connect is a Layer 2 solution based on StarkEx technology, specifically designed to provide centralized investment and trading services to financial institutions.

    Value Secured

    2024 Mar 09 — 2025 Mar 09

    Risk summary
    Canvas Connect is currently open only to whitelisted institutional clients.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the proof system is implemented incorrectly,
    2. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    Users can be censored if

    1. the committee restricts their access to the external data,
    2. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Canvas Connect is currently open only to whitelisted institutional clients.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

    State validation

    ZK proofs (ST)

    STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

    Data availability

    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.

    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

    1. Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation

    Zero knowledge STARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    1. STARK Core Engine Deep Dive

    Data is not stored on chain

    The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation
    2. Validium - StarkEx documentation
    3. Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Operator - StarkEx documentation

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    1. Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1.ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.

    1. Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    Permissions

    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Operator (2) 0x1076…8cB50x5751…f21A

    Permissioned to regularly update and prove the state of the L2 on L1.

    Governor EOA 1

    Permissioned to manage the Operator role, finalize state and change critical parameters like the programHash, configHash, or message cancellation delay in the core contract.

    Actors:

    SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig 0x21F9…AEc4
    • A Multisig with 2 / 4 threshold.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of SHARPVerifierCallProxy.

    Participants (4):

    0x0405…84880x5923…85580xebc8…fD7F0x955B…2Fec

    Used in:

    EOA 1 0xc7C7…8C7A
    • A Governor.
    • Is allowed to interact with StarkExchange - manage the token admin role.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of StarkExchange.
    EOA 3 0x3e10…ac1D

    Is allowed to interact with StarkExchange - Can regsiter new tokens for deposits and withdrawals.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    StarkExchange 0x7A7f…7f9dImplementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Implementation #3 (Upgradable)Implementation #4 (Upgradable)Implementation #5 (Upgradable)Implementation #6 (Upgradable)Implementation #7 (Upgradable)Admin

    Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH, USDC.

    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 1 with no delay

    Implementation used in:

    DACommittee 0x8B3A…a818

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 1.

    SHARPVerifierCallProxy 0x4731…Db60Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Upgradable contract through which the SHARPVerifier can be called. This allows SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig to change the otherwise immutable verifier contract with 0s delay.

    Can be upgraded by:
    SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig with no delay

    Proxy used in:

    SHARPVerifier 0x9fb7…1942

    Shared Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet and other SN stack and StarkEx projects. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover and verifies the integrity of the offchain execution including a correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.

    Implementation used in:

    GpsFactRegistryAdapter 0x5339…5143

    Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513).

    Implementation used in:

    OrderRegistry 0x806d…7fe6

    Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1.

    Implementation used in:

    MemoryPageFactRegistry 0xe583…C460

    Auxiliary to the SHARPVerifier contract: Verified ‘memory fact pages’ get stored here. This is important as it registers all necessary onchain data produced by the verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).