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Myria logoMyria

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About

Myria is an expansive blockchain gaming ecosystem, comprised of a blockchain gaming hub and Myriaverse metaverse.


Value secured
$111.52 K17.9%
Canonically Bridged
$111.52 K
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$0.00

  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    0.121.68%
  • 30D ops count
    300.08 K
  • Type
    Validium

  • Purposes
    NFT, Exchange, Gaming
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Myria is an expansive blockchain gaming ecosystem, comprised of a blockchain gaming hub and Myriaverse metaverse.

    Recategorisation

    101d
    01h
    57m
    33s

    The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.

    The project will move to Others because:

    The data availability committee threshold is too low

    Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation
    Value Secured

    2024 Mar 09 — 2025 Mar 09

    Activity

    2024 Mar 09 — 2025 Mar 08

    Milestones & Incidents

    MYRIA Token Airdrop

    2023 Apr 6th

    MYRIA token launches.

    Learn more

    Mainnet Launch

    2022 Aug 26th

    Layer 2 scaling solution powered by Starware is live on Ethereum.

    Learn more
    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

    State validation

    ZK proofs (ST)

    STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

    Data availability

    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.

    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

    1. Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation

    Zero knowledge STARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    1. STARK Core Engine Deep Dive

    Data is not stored on chain

    The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation
    2. Validium - StarkEx documentation
    3. Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation
    Data availability

    Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

    Risk analysis
    DA Layer Risks
    Economic security
    None

    There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

    Fraud detection
    None

    There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

    DA Bridge Risks
    Committee security
    2/5

    The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

    Upgradeability
    Immutable

    The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved.

    Relayer failure
    Self propose

    Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.

    Technology

    Architecture

    starkex architecture

    The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:

    • Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
    • Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
    • Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.

    Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.

    When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.

    Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.

    DA Bridge Architecture

    starkex bridge architecture

    The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.

    The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.

    • Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.

    1. StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Operator - StarkEx documentation

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    1. Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1.ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.

    1. Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    Permissions

    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Operator 0xe997…DdED

    Permissioned to regularly update and prove the state of the L2 on L1.

    Governor EOA 1

    Permissioned to manage the Operator role, finalize state and change critical parameters like the programHash, configHash, or message cancellation delay in the core contract.

    Actors:

    SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig 0x21F9…AEc4
    • A Multisig with 2 / 4 threshold.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of SHARPVerifierCallProxy.

    Used in:

    • A Governor.
    • Is allowed to interact with StarkExchange - manage the token admin role.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of StarkExchange with 14d delay.

    Is allowed to interact with StarkExchange - Can regsiter new tokens for deposits and withdrawals.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    DACommittee 0x1e60…69cB

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 2.

    Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Implementation used in:

    Upgradable contract through which the SHARPVerifier can be called. This allows SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig to change the otherwise immutable verifier contract with 0s delay.

    Proxy used in:

    SHARPVerifier 0x9fb7…1942

    Shared Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet and other SN stack and StarkEx projects. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover and verifies the integrity of the offchain execution including a correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.

    Implementation used in:

    GpsFactRegistryAdapter 0x5339…5143

    Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513).

    Implementation used in:

    OrderRegistry 0x806d…7fe6

    Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1.

    Implementation used in:

    MemoryPageFactRegistry 0xe583…C460

    Auxiliary to the SHARPVerifier contract: Verified ‘memory fact pages’ get stored here. This is important as it registers all necessary onchain data produced by the verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).